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Abstract: Water scarcity is a critical environmental issue worldwide, especially in arid and semiarid
regions. In those regions, climate change projections suggest further reductions in freshwater supplies
and increases of the recurrence, longevity and intensity of drought events. At present, one important
question for policy debate is the identification of water policies that could address the mounting
water scarcity problems. Suitable policies should improve economic efficiency, achieve environmental
sustainability, and meet equity needs. This paper develops and applies an integrated hydro-economic
model that links hydrological, economic and environmental elements to such issues. The model is
used to conduct a direct comparison of water markets, water pricing and institutional cooperation,
based on their economic, environmental and equity outcomes. The analysis is performed in the
Jucar Basin of Spain, which is a good natural experiment for studying water scarcity and climate
change policies. Results indicate that both institutional and water market policies are high performing
instruments to limit the economic damage costs of droughts, achieving almost the same social benefits.
However, the environmental effects of water markets are worrying. Another important finding is
that water pricing is a poor policy option not only in terms of private and environmental benefits but
also in terms of equity.
Keywords: water scarcity; climate change; water policies; hydro-economic modeling; economic and
environmental benefits
1. Introduction
Water scarcity and water quality degradation are becoming widespread problems in most regions
around the world. The reasons are the large increase in global water extractions in the last century
from 600 to 3900 km3, driven by the intensive growth of population and income, coupled with a
questionable performance of water governance and policies [1].
The scale of the global growing overexploitation indicates that water mismanagement is quite
common, and that sustainable management of basins is a complex and difficult task. At first, water
scarcity resulted from surface extractions, but recently it is worsening because of the unprecedented
depletion of groundwater brought about by falling pumping costs. Between 1960 and 2000,
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groundwater extractions rose from 310 to 730 km3 per year pushing depletion up to 150 km3 [2].
This staggering annual depletion ranges from 50 km3 in the Indus-Ganges-Brahmaputra region to
24 km3 in the USA, and is 13 km3 in the Tigris-Euphrates region, and 9 km3 in Northern China (NASA
GRACE data estimations).
Water scarcity is increased gradually by the decisions on water extractions in river basins linked
to land use and economic activities. The problems arising from water scarcity could become critical
during drought periods. Climate change is projected to aggravate the severity and recurrence
of drought events, especially in arid and semiarid regions [3]. In those regions, the combined
effects of human-induced permanent water scarcity and climate change-induced droughts portend
unprecedented levels of water resources degradation.
The sustainable management of water is quite challenging because of the different types of goods
and services provided by water. These goods and services can be classified as private goods, common
pool resources, or public goods, depending on the degree of exclusion and rivalry in consumption
among consumers. A good is non-excludable when individuals cannot be excluded from their use,
and a good is non-rival when consumption by one individual does not reduce availability to others.
Treated drinkable water in urban networks is close to a private good (rivalry & exclusion), water
in surface watercourses and aquifers is close to a common pool resource (rivalry & non-exclusion),
while water sustaining ecosystems comes close to a public good (non-rivalry & non-exclusion) [4].
The management of water is governed by public policies because pure competitive markets fail to
account for the common pool and public good characteristics of water.
The contribution of this paper is to develop and apply an innovative approach to inform the
ongoing policy discussion addressing water scarcity and droughts. A hydro-economic model of the
Jucar Basin in Spain is used to conduct a direct comparison of policies based on their economic,
environmental and equity effects. Three policy alternatives are considered: (1) an institutional
approach based on stakeholders’ cooperation; (2) a water market policy; and (3) a water pricing policy.
The assessment of the three policies provides information to stakeholders and decision makers about
the tradeoffs between the policies in the allocation of water among sectors and locations. The paper
is organized as follows. The three types of water policies are reviewed in Section 2. Then, the Jucar
River Basin and the modeling framework are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the drought
and policy scenarios and the simulation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the summary and
policy implications.
2. Types of Policy Instruments
Three types of policy instruments could address the market externalities created by the common
pool and public good characteristics of water. The first type is the “Pigou solution”, based on taxation
of water extractions [5]. This is the water pricing approach that is being implemented in the European
Water Framework Directive (WFD) [6]. The second type is the “Coase solution”, which is based on
privatizing the resource and trading [7]. This is the water market approach that has been implemented
in Australia [8]. The third type is the common property governance [9], based on the evidence that
coercive government rules can fail because they lack legitimacy and knowledge of local conditions. This
is the institutional cooperative approach, where affected stakeholders design the rules and enforcement
mechanisms for the sustainable management of common pool resources [10], although this approach
has not received widespread attention in either research or policy circles.
Mainstream water policies in some countries are derived from the Dublin Statement on Water,
which declares water an economic good [11], and are based on so-called economic instruments such
as water markets or water pricing. Besides the European Union and Australia, both water pricing
and water markets are being considered at present for solving the acute water scarcity problems in
China [12].
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These economic instruments can work well when water exhibits private good characteristics such
as in urban networks, but work less well when water exhibits common pool resource or public good
characteristics. There is a strong consensus among experts that water pricing could achieve sizable
gains in efficiency and welfare in urban and industrial water networks [13], although implementation
could face technical and political difficulties. Irrigation water from surface watercourses and
aquifers exhibits common pool resource characteristics, and the use of economic instruments requires
transforming the resource into a private good. This transformation is quite difficult, especially in
arid and semiarid regions under strong water scarcity pressures, and would require the support
of stakeholders.
Water pricing in irrigation, to achieve water conservation, has been the subject of debate since
the 1990s. A string of the literature finds that irrigation water pricing has limited effects on water
conservation [14,15], and some authors indicate that water markets seem far more effective than water
pricing for allocating irrigation water [16]. Several studies in Spain support those previous findings,
but also find that water pricing policy involves disproportionate costs to farmers [17,18]. In contrast,
Tsur et al. [19] indicate that water pricing could achieve an efficient allocation of irrigation water
without damaging farmers’ benefits, if the pricing policy guarantees that all or part of the revenue
collected by water agencies remains in the area and is reinvested in improving water use efficiency.
In recent decades, the water market approach has been gaining ground in some parts of the world
to allocate water to irrigation such as in Australia and Chile. Previous studies in the literature consider
that water trading is a flexible and efficient way to address water allocation problems [20–22]. These
studies indicate that water markets may increase water use efficiency, avoid the development of new
costly water resources, and achieve significant welfare gains by reallocating water from crops with low
to high marginal value of water. Numerous pre-requisites are needed for the design of well-functioning
water markets such as the definition of water rights, the creation of legal and institutional frameworks
for trade, and investments in infrastructure to facilitate water transfer [23].
The Murray-Darling Basin in Australia is the main agricultural area in the country. It is at present
the most active water market in the world, and during the drought of 2002–2012, this market generated
benefits in the range of several hundred million to 1 billion US dollars per year [24,25]. A challenge
to water markets is the third party effects such as environmental impacts, which would reduce the
benefits of trading. Water markets reduce streamflows because previously unused water allocations
are traded, and also because gains in irrigation efficiency at a parcel level reduce drainage and return
flows to the environment downstream. This reduction in basin return flows has been demonstrated
in different settings [26–28]. Another worrying effect is the large surge in groundwater extractions,
as shown in the last drought in the Murray-Darling Basin (Blewett [29] indicates that extractions
between 2002 and 2007 were seven times above the allowed limits placed on groundwater users).
The choice in Australia has been to mostly ignore the third party impacts of water markets [24].
Medellín et al. [30] estimate very large potential gains from water trading under droughts or
climate change in California. These gains in the Central Valley of California are estimated at 1.4 billion
US dollars. However, implementing these potential gains from trading is quite a challenge as the
failure of the Water Bank experience in the 2009 drought shows. Water transfers were blocked by the
water exporting regions and environmentalist NGOs.
Culp et al. [31] indicate that the highly complex institutional setting in western USA, including a
set of restrictive laws and regulations on water rights, imposes significant obstacles to water trading.
Thus, the transaction costs of trading are extremely high, limiting the achievement of the full potential
of water markets. The issue of transaction costs has been analyzed by Regnacq et al. [32] for the case
of California water markets. Their empirical results show the importance of the transaction costs
linked to distance and institutional impediments in the decision to trade. Although part of these costs
represents a legitimate means to avoid third party impacts (especially the natural environment), the
rest of the costs could be reduced to increase trade. The attainment of the water markets solution seems
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to require well-functioning institutions, involving stakeholders’ cooperation and more transparent
administrative mechanisms.
In Spain, the approach to water management is based on institutional arrangements and relies
on the river basin authorities. The basin authorities are responsible for water management, water
allocation, control and enforcement, planning and waterworks. The special feature of this institutional
arrangement is the key role played by stakeholders in managing the basin authority.
Stakeholders are part of the basin authorities, taking decisions in the basin governing bodies and
in local watershed boards, and they are involved at all levels of decision making: planning, financing,
waterworks, measures design, enforcement, and water management. The management of water is
decentralized, with the basin authorities in charge of water allocation, and water user associations in
charge of secondary infrastructure and water usage. The main advantage of this institutional setting is
that stakeholders cooperate in the design and enforcement of decisions, rules and regulations, and
therefore the implementation and enforcement processes are conducted smoothly [33].
Therefore, water allocation relies on the cooperation of stakeholders in basin authorities. Although
water management in Spain is far from perfect, there have been recent mounting signs of successful
experiences in the case of the La Mancha aquifers [34], where aquifer extractions have been curbed
through stakeholders’ cooperation.
Irrigated agriculture is the largest user of water in most arid and semiarid regions, and plays an
important role in sustaining rural livelihoods and ecosystems. Adjustments to the shortfall of water
supply in basins fall mainly on irrigation activities, which often trigger considerable economic and
environmental impacts, and social conflicts. One important question for future policy debates is the
identification of potential water management policies in irrigation. Suitable policies should improve
economic efficiency, achieve environmental sustainability, and address equity when faced by growing
scarcity, droughts and climate change.
Previous studies in the literature analyzed the advantages and limitations of the different
approaches to allocate water in irrigation. We find that there is a gap in previous literature regarding
the comparison between policy instruments in order to address the market externalities of water
resources, and also to determine the relative efficacy of these different policy approaches. Filling this
gap may improve the performance of water policies in many basins. The contribution of this paper is to
apply state-of-art methodology in the direct comparison of three important water policy instruments:
water markets, water pricing, and the status-quo institutional cooperation. The analysis is performed
by formulating and applying an integrated hydro-economic model that links hydrological, economic,
and environmental elements to assess the performance outcomes of these policies.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. The Jucar River Basin
The Jucar River Basin (JRB) is located in the regions of Valencia and Castilla-La Mancha in Eastern
Spain. It extends over 22,300 km2 and covers the area drained by the Jucar River and its tributaries,
mainly the Magro and the Cabriel Rivers (Figure 1). The Basin has an irregular Mediterranean
hydrology, characterized by recurrent drought spells and normal years with dry summers.
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Figure 1. Map of the Jucar River Basin. 
The JRB renewable water resources are nearly 1700 Mm3/year but water extractions are very 
close to renewable resources, 1680 Mm3, and the Basin is almost a closed water system. The main 
water use is irrigated agriculture with 1400 Mm3, followed by urban and industrial uses of 270 Mm3, 
which supply households, industries, and services of more than one million inhabitants (Table 1). 
There are also non-consumptive uses for hydropower, aquaculture and recreation. 
Table 1. Water use by sector and origin in the JRB in a normal flow year (Mm3). Source: CHJ [35]. 
Origin Agriculture Urban Industrial Total 
Surface water  761 118 24 903 
Groundwater 633 104 25 762 
Reuse 11 0 1 12 
Total 1405 222 50 1677 
The irrigated area extends over 190,000 ha, and the main crops grown are rice, wheat, barley, 
garlic, lettuce, grapes, and citrus. There are three major irrigation areas located in the upper Jucar, 
the lower Jucar, and the bordering area of the Turia Basin. The Eastern La Mancha irrigation area 
(EM) is located in the upper Jucar, covering 100,000 ha. The irrigation districts of Acequia Real del 
Jucar (ARJ), Escalona y Carcagente (ESC), and Ribera Baja (RB) are in the lower Jucar, with an area of 
35,000 ha. The irrigation district of Canal Jucar-Turia (CJT) is located in the bordering Turia Basin 
with an area of 22,000 ha (Table 2). 
Table 2. The main water users in the JRB. Source. CHJ [35]. 
Water users 
Water Use (Mm3)
Surface Water Groundwater Total 
City of Albacete 17 0 17 
EM aquifer irrigation district 13 386 399 
Nuclear central of Cofrentes 14 0 14 
City of Valencia 95 0 95 
City of Sagunto 8 0 8 
CJT irrigation district 70 91 161 
ARJ irrigation district 213 0 213 
ESC irrigation district 38 0 38 
Figure 1. Map of the J car River Basin.
The JRB renewable water resources are nearly 1700 Mm3/year but water extractions are very close
to renewable resou ces, 1680 Mm3, and the Basin is almost a closed water system. The main water
use is irrigated agricult re with 1400 Mm3, followed by urban nd industrial uses of 270 Mm3, which
supply households, industries, and services of more than one million inhabitants (Table 1). There are
also non-consumptive uses for hydropower, aquaculture and recreation.
Table 1. Water use by sector and origin in the JRB in a normal flow year (Mm3). Source: CHJ [35].
Origin Agriculture Urban Industrial Total
Surface water 761 118 24 903
Groundwater 633 104 25 762
Reuse 11 0 1 12
Total 1405 222 50 1677
The irrigated area extends over 190,000 ha, and the main cr ps grown are rice, wheat, barley,
garlic, lettuce, grapes, and citrus. There are three major irrigation areas located in the upper Jucar, the
lower Jucar, and the bordering area of the Turia Basin. The Eastern La Mancha irrigation area (EM) is
located in the upper Jucar, covering 100,000 ha. The irrigation districts of Acequia Real del Jucar (ARJ),
Escalona y Carcagente (ESC), and Ribera B ja (RB) are in the lower Jucar, with an area of 35,000 ha.
The irrigation district of Canal Jucar-Turia (CJT) is located in the bordering Turia Basin with an area of
22,000 ha (Table 2).
Table 2. The main water users in the JRB. Source. CHJ [35].
Water Users
Water Use (Mm3)
Surface Water Groundwater Total
City of Albacete 17 0 17
EM aquifer irrigation district 13 386 399
Nuclear central of Cofrentes 14 0 14
City of Valencia 95 0 95
City of Sagunto 8 0 8
CJT irrigation district 70 91 161
ARJ irrigation district 213 0 213
ESC irrigation district 38 0 38
RB irrigation district 254 0 254
Other uses 193 285 478
Total JRB 915 762 1677
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The expansion of water extractions in the Basin and the severe drought spells in recent decades
have triggered considerable negative environmental and economic impacts. The growth of water
extractions in recent decades has been driven especially by subsurface irrigation from the EM aquifer.
The aquifer depletion, combined with other important water extractions in the Basin, and the recurrent
drought spells have caused the water flows in the Jucar River to diminish. Environmental flows are
dwindling in many parts of the Basin, resulting in serious damages to water-dependent ecosystems.
There have been negative impacts on the downstream water users. For instance, the water available to
the ARJ district has fallen from 700 to 200 Mm3 in the last 40 years. Consequently, the dwindling return
flows from the irrigation districts in the lower Jucar have caused serious environmental problems to
the Albufera wetland, which is mostly fed by these return flows [36].
The Albufera wetland is the main aquatic ecosystem in the JRB. It is a fresh-water lagoon included
in the RAMSAR list, and was declared a special protected area for birds (The RAMSAR convention
is an international treaty for the conservation and sustainable utilization of wetlands). The Albufera
wetland receives water from the return flows of the irrigation districts in the lower Jucar, mainly from
the ARJ and the RB irrigation districts, and other flows originate from discharges of untreated and
treated urban and industrial wastewaters. There is an important water quality problem driven by
deficiencies in the sewage disposal and treatment systems in the adjacent municipalities, and by the
reduced flows originating from the Jucar River that are used to improve the quality of wastewater
discharges [37].
The increased frequency and intensity of drought spells during recent decades has been addressed
by the Jucar Basin authority with investments in several long-term adaptation measures, such as
construction of storage and regulation facilities, improvement of water efficiency through investment in
irrigation systems, and installation of metering devices and special groundwater monitoring programs
to control groundwater extractions.
3.2. The Modeling Framework
The comparison of policies is based on the hydro-economic model developed in Kahil et al. [38].
The model includes three components: (1) a reduced form hydrological sub-model; (2) a regional
economic sub-model consisting of irrigation districts and urban centers; and (3) an environmental
benefit sub-model. The reduced form hydrological sub-model is used to link the different components
of the River Basin and to simulate the spatial hydrological impacts of droughts. The mathematical
formulation of the reduced form hydrological sub-model is as follows:
Woutd “Wind ´Wlossd ´DivIRd ´DivURBd (1)
Wind`1 “Woutd ` rIRd ¨
´
DivIRd
¯
` rURBd ¨
´
DivURBd
¯
` ROd`1 (2)
Woutd • Emind (3)
where Equations (1)–(3) are the mass balance, the flow continuity, and the minimum-environmental
flow constraints, respectively. These constraints determine the water available in the different river
reaches that can be used after considering the environmental restrictions. Woutd is the water outflow
from a river reach d;Wind the water inflow to d;Wlossd the loss of water in d; DivIRd the water diversion
to irrigation districts located in d; DivURBd the water diversion to urban and industrial activities located
in d; Wind`1 the water inflow to the next river reach d ` 1;
“
rIRd ¨
`
DivIRd
˘‰
the return flows from
irrigation districts;
“
rURBd ¨
`
DivURBd
˘‰
the return flows from urban and industrial activities; ROd`1
the runoff entering river reach d` 1 from tributaries; and Emind the minimum environmental flow
established for each river reach.
The regional economic sub-model accounts for the decision processes made by irrigation water
users in the five major irrigation districts (EM, CJT, ARJ, ESC, and RB) and by urban users in the
three main cities (Valencia, Albacete, and Sagunto). A farm-level programming component has been
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developed for each irrigation district, which maximizes farmers’ private benefits from irrigation
activities by choosing a crop mix subject to various technical and resource constraints. A Leontief
production function technology is assumed with fixed input and output prices, in which farmers are
price takers. The optimization problem is given by the following formulation:
Max BIRk “
ÿ
ij
C1ijk¨Xijk (4)
subject to ÿ
i
Xijk § Tlandkj (5)
ÿ
ij
Wijk¨Xijk § Twaterk (6)
ÿ
ij
Lijk¨Xijk § Tlabork (7)
Xijk • 0 (9)
where BIRk is farmers’ net benefits in irrigation district k. C
1
ijk is a vector of coefficients of net income
per hectare of crop i using irrigation technology j. The net income of each crop is equal to revenue
minus direct and indirect costs, and amortizations. The decision variable in the optimization problem
is Xijk, corresponding to the area of crop i using irrigation technology j. Crops are aggregated into
three representative crop groups: cereals, vegetables, and fruit trees. Irrigation technologies are flood,
sprinkler, and drip.
Constraint Equation (5) represents the available area for irrigation equipped with technology j in
irrigation district k, Tlandkj. The water constraint Equation (6) represents irrigation water availability
in irrigation district k, Twaterk, which depends on surface and subsurface water extractions for
that district. Parameter Wijk is gross water requirements per hectare of each crop i using irrigation
technology j. The labor constraint Equation (7) represents labor availability in irrigation district k,
Tlabork. Parameter Lijk is labor requirements per hectare of crop i using irrigation technology j.
For urban water uses, an economic surplus optimization scheme has been developed for each
city in the Basin. The optimization problem maximizes social surplus given by the consumer and
producer surplus from water use in each city, subject to several physical and institutional constraints.
The optimization problem is:
Max BURBu “
ˆ
adu¨Qdu ´ 12 ¨ bdu¨Q
2
du ´ asu¨Qsu ´
1
2
¨ bsu¨Q2su
˙
(9)
subject to
Qdu ´Qsu § 0 (10)
Qdu, Qsu • 0 (11)
where BURBu is the consumer and producer surplus of city u. Variables Qdu and Qsu are water demand
and supply by/to the city u, respectively. Parameters adu and bdu are the intercept and slope of the
inverse demand function, while parameters asu and bsu are the intercept and slope of the water supply
function. Equation (10) states that supply must be greater than or equal to demand. The quantity
supplied, Qsu, is the connecting variable between urban use optimization components and the reduced
form hydrological sub-model.
The environmental benefits sub-model accounts for the environmental benefits generated by
the main aquatic ecosystem in the JRB, the Albufera wetland. The sub-model considers only water
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inflows to the Albufera wetland originating from irrigation return flows of the downstreamARJ and RB
irrigation districts. Inflows and benefits of the Albufera wetland are given by the following expressions:
EAlbu f era “ a¨ rIRARJ ¨
´
DIRARJ
¯
` b¨ rIRRB¨
´
DIRRB
¯
(12)
BAlbu f era “
$’&’%
r1¨ EAlbu f era i f 0 § EAlbu f era § E1
d2 ` r2¨ EAlbu f era i f E1 † EAlbu f era § E2
d3 ` r3¨ EAlbu f era i f EAlbu f era ° E2
(13)
where Equation (12) determines the quantity of water flowing to the Albufera wetland, EAlbu f era.
Parameters ↵ and   represent the shares of return flows that feed the wetland from the ARJ and RB
irrigation districts, respectively. The products [rIRARJ ¨ pDIRARJq] and [rIRRB¨ pDIRRB)] are return flows from
the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively.
Equation (13) represents economic environmental benefits, BAlbu f era, from the ecosystem services
that the Albufera wetland provides to society. The environmental benefit function is assumed to be
a piecewise linear function of water inflows, EAlbu f era, to the wetland. This function expresses shifts
in the ecosystem status when critical thresholds of water inflows E1 and E2 are reached, following
the approach of Scheffer et al. [39]. The reason is that ecosystems do not always respond smoothly
to changes in environmental conditions, and they may switch abruptly to a contrasting alternative
state for certain critical levels. Time series data of various hydrological and chemical indicators have
been collected to characterize the ecosystem health status of the wetland [35], along with economic
valuation studies of the Albufera and other wetlands [40–42]. The specification and estimation of the
environmental benefit function are described in Kahil et al. [38].
Detailed information on the technical coefficients and parameters of the hydro-economic
model has been collected from field surveys, expert consultation, statistics, and reviewing the
literature [35,43–47]. This information covers water inflows to the Basin, water diversion to users,
urbanwater prices and costs, efficiency of primary and secondary conveyance channels, crop yields and
prices, subsidies, production costs, amortizations, crop water requirements, crop labor requirements,
land and labor availability, and groundwater extractions.
4. Comparison of Water Policies
Results from running the hydro-economic model are used to analyze the economic and
environmental effects of the three alternative water policies designed to cope with scarcity and
drought: the current institutional arrangement of the basin authority, water markets, and water pricing.
Water markets and water pricing are implemented differently. First, the model is run to maximize
the private benefits of irrigation and urban use. This solution entails the optimal water allocations
and optimal shadow prices (Shadow prices reflect the economic value of water to users and their
willingness to pay for it. In technical terms, the shadow price of water is the marginal value of water for
the particular user, or the value the user obtains from applying an additional unit of water. In the water
market policy, water is exchanged until the shadow prices are equalized among all users, following
the equi-marginal rule). Two policies can be implemented to achieve this optimal solution. One is
water markets, where trading among users leads to the optimal water allocations (which generate
the corresponding shadow prices). The other policy is water pricing, where water taxes are used to
align current water prices with the optimal shadow prices (which generate the corresponding water
allocations). The resulting benefits for farmers are quite different under water markets and water
pricing, since farmers make revenue when selling water with markets, but with water pricing, they
lose revenue because of the water taxes.
The model provides results on the private benefits of users, environmental benefits, water use
and return flows, and inflows to the Albufera wetland. Social benefits are assumed to be the sum of
the private benefits from irrigation and urban use, and the environmental benefits (Table 3).
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Table 3. Policies under drought: institutional cooperation, water markets, and water pricing.
Drought Scenario Normal Year Mild Drought Severe Drought
Type of Water
Policy
Current Situation
(Institutional
Cooperation)
Institutional
Cooperation
Water
Markets
Water
Pricing
Institutional
Cooperation
Water
Markets
Water
Pricing
Water Use (Mm3) a
Irrigation districts 1030 908 908 908 683 683 683
EM 399 359 363 363 304 316 316
CJT 155 132 150 150 107 146 146
ARJ 200 180 197 197 131 185 185
ESC 33 30 32 32 18 31 31
RB 243 207 166 166 123 4 4
Urban use 119 105 105 105 74 74 74
Traded water - - 40 - - 120 -
Environmental
flows (inflows to
Albufera)
60 52 50 50 34 29 29
Private and Environmental Benefits (million Euros) b
Private benefits
Irrigation districts 190 171 175 93 136 148 54
EM 80 72 72 37 61 62 31
CJT 45 40 42 33 36 39 17
ARJ 34 31 32 17 23 25 4
ESC 7 7 7 5 4 5 2
RB 24 21 22 1 12 17 0
Urban use 283 276 276 276 241 241 241
Total 473 447 451 369 377 389 295
Environmental
benefits 75 37 32 32 22 19 19
Social benefits 548 484 483 401 399 408 314
Note: a Water allocations to irrigation, urban use and environment in million cubic meters. b Private benefits
from irrigation and urban use, and environmental benefits in million Euros.
Two drought scenarios are considered, mild drought and severe drought. The reduction of water
inflows over normal levels is 22 percent for mild droughts, and 66 percent for severe droughts. More
information on the characterization of drought scenarios can be found in Kahil et al. [38]. The model
simulates the outcomes of the three alternative policies to deal with these two drought scenarios.
Institutional cooperation is the baseline policy, and represents the current water management to cope
with scarcity and droughts. The basin authorities are the main administrative bodies responsible for
water management, and they are organized around the governing boards, the stakeholder boards, and
the management services. An important feature of basin authorities is the involvement of stakeholders,
which has been a permanent characteristic since their creation in the 1920’s. Stakeholders include
water users, public administrations, farmers’ unions and environmental groups. The stakeholders’
representatives are present in all governing and participation bodies at the basin scale, and run the
watershed boards at the local scale [33].
This approach entails flexible adaptive changes in water allocations based on the negotiation and
cooperation of users, where water stakeholders are involved in the decision making process, including
the environmental concerns. The water allocations that result from cooperation are observed in the
data from both normal and drought periods.
The water market policy opens up water trading between economic agents in irrigation districts
and urban centers. Economic theory predicts that water markets achieve welfare gains by reallocating
water from low to high marginal values of water, and this efficient use of water maximizes the total
private benefits summed over agents. The model is used to test the water market policy alternative,
and empirically estimate the market potential welfare gains. Water trade becomes more pronounced
as drought severity intensifies, reaching 120 Mm3 under severe drought. The main effect is the
improvement of irrigation efficiency, but also the subsequent fall in irrigation return flows, which
further reduce the environmental flows in the basin.
Water 2016, 8, 34 10 of 15
The water pricing policy achieves also the efficient use of water by adjusting water prices to balance
water demand with the available water supply during drought. This policy alternative is in line with
the water pricing policy advocated by the European Water Framework Directive, reiterated in the
recent Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources [6]. Water prices in each irrigation district and
urban center are set equal to the marginal value of water at the efficient level of water use, which is the
market-clearing price. This water tax revenue is collected by the public and private water agencies
responsible for water supply. All or part of this revenue may be employed outside the basin areas,
representing a loss of benefit from both individual farmer and basin perspectives. One advantage
of the water pricing policy is that it assures the financial viability of the water agencies, which could
guarantee their operation without the need of public subsidies. As indicated above, the water taxes
levied with water pricing involve significant revenue losses for farmers.
Social benefits under the institutional or baseline policy in normal flow conditions amount to
548 million Euros. Private benefits are 190 million Euros for irrigation and 283 million for urban
demand, from using 1030 and 119 Mm3 of water, respectively. Environmental benefits provided by
the Albufera wetland are 75 million Euros, and the Albufera wetland receives 60 Mm3 of return flows
from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, which support the ecological status of the wetland.
4.1. Mild Drought Scenario
Mild drought events reduce social benefits by 65 million Euros under the institutional and
water market policies, but the social benefits are reduced by 150 million Euros under water pricing.
The environmental losses are close to 40 million Euros under all policies, cutting environmental
benefits by half. The difference among policies is the irrigation losses, which are below 20 million
under institutional andwater market policies, but escalate to 100million under water pricing. Therefore
the large benefit losses from the water pricing policy are driven by the large impact of pricing on
irrigation profits.
The environment sustains significant benefit losses derived from the reduction of water inflows
to the Albufera wetland. These water inflows under water markets and water pricing fall below the
critical threshold E1, creating a regime shift in the wetland. The institutional policy achieves higher
environmental benefits because it allocates more water to the Albufera wetland, avoiding further
desiccation and ecosystem degradation.
The effects on the urban sector are moderate both in terms of water allocations and private benefits.
The reason is the priority rules under the institutional policy, and also the availability of additional
water sources at higher costs from neighboring basins in the case of Valencia and Sagunto (Turia Basin),
or groundwater in the case of Albacete.
Farmers face diminishing water use from drought and reduced crop acreage, mostly cereals
because these are the less profitable crops. The allocation of irrigation water to the RB, ARJ and CJT
districts changes between the institutional and water market policies. Water markets allocate 40 Mm3
less water to RB, and this water is assigned to ARJ and CJT. These water exchanges are driven by the
differences among water shadow prices in districts. As indicated above, the shadow prices of water
are the marginal values of water in each location, and therefore water exchanges reallocate water from
locations with low marginal values of water to locations with high marginal values where water is
more profitable. However, the private benefits of all irrigation districts are almost the same under both
the institutional and water market policies.
The opportunity costs of policies incurred by farmers are the benefit losses sustained under each
policy. A steep increase in the opportunity costs of a particular policy would be met by opposition
from farmers leading to policy failure, given that other feasible policies are less costly. The costs of the
water pricing policy are very high for farmers compared to the institutional or water market policies,
with irrigation benefits falling by half when water pricing is implemented instead of the other policies.
The reason for these high costs is the large losses sustained by farmers from taxing water. Opposition
to the water pricing policy would be strong in the RB, EM and ARJ districts, where the opportunity
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costs of implementing water pricing are especially damaging to farmers. This empirical finding shows
that the institutional and water market policy options are much more feasible and equitable than water
pricing, because water pricing involves disproportionate costs to farmers.
4.2. Severe Drought Scenario
The effects of severe drought are more pronounced than those of mild drought, although they
show similar patterns. The fall in social benefits is almost 150 million Euros under the institutional
and water market policies, but social benefits losses escalate to almost 250 million under water pricing.
Environmental benefits sustain quite large losses, although the institutional policy allocates slightly
more environmental flows to the Albufera wetland.
The irrigation benefits by district are almost the same under the institutional and water market
policies, and the main difference is the change in water allocation to the RB, ARJ and CJT districts.
Compared to the institutional policy, water markets are driven by the shadow prices of water,
reallocating water from locations with low marginal value of water to locations with high marginal
value. Water trading allocates more water to the ARJ, ESC, EM and CJT districts by reducing the
allocation of the RB district by 120 Mm3.
Choosing the water pricing policy under severe drought is quite detrimental to farmers because
water taxes escalate, and they cannot generate revenue by selling water. The implementation of water
pricing instead of the institutional or water market policies, makes farmers lose two thirds of their
private profits. In districts such as RB and ARJ, the private benefits of farmers are almost entirely
wiped out. The opportunity costs for farmers of the water pricing policy are disproportionate.
The total costs and their distribution among those who bear them from confronting a severe
drought in the Jucar Basin by the irrigation, urban and environmental sectors depend on the policy
selected by decision makers, and these costs are given by the benefit losses incurred by each sector.
These costs are 42 million Euros for the urban sector (283–241) and 53 million for the environment
(75–22) regardless of the policy chosen, but these costs triple from 50 million Euros (190–140) to
almost 150 million (190–54) for the irrigation sector by selecting the water pricing policy instead of the
other policies.
4.3. Additional Measures to Protect The Environment
Protecting environmental flows, especially during droughts, is a major challenge in almost
all basins in arid and semiarid regions. In these basins, regulators face a challenge to enforce
environmental flows not only because they have to control surface and subsurface extractions, but also
because the irrigation returns component of environmental flows is even more difficult to regulate than
water extractions. Examples of these management difficulties include basins where water management
efforts are quite sophisticated, such as the Jucar basin in Spain, the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia,
and the Central Valley in California (In the Jucar Basin, there was a desiccation of the Jucar mainstem
during the last drought [34]. In the Murray-Darling Basin, groundwater depletion reached 104 km3
during the last drought [29]. In the Central Valley of California, groundwater depletion has reached
80 km3 during the current drought [48]).
Two additional measures are considered for the JRB to protect environmental flows, one associated
with water markets and the other with the institutional policy. The first measure follows the example of
the Murray-Darling Basin, where a very expensive program is being implemented to recover water for
the environment using a public water buyback program [49]. Although expensive, this seems to be a
workable policy to reap most of the private benefits of pure water markets while protecting ecosystems,
and this could be called the environmental water market. The second measure is to improve the
current institutional stakeholder cooperation in Jucar, by including environmental stakeholders as
full participants. These augmented environmental flows are achieved by the negotiation among all
economic and environmental stakeholders, which appears to be a sustainable institutional policy.
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Both the environmental water market and the sustainable institutional policies achieve large gains
in environmental benefits, above 200 Million Euros in mild and severe droughts, with social benefits in
the Basin reaching around 730 million Euros under mild drought and 660 million Euros under severe
drought [38,50].
5. Conclusions
The sustainable use of water resources requires a reliable understanding of the main processes
and their linkages, an accurate assessment of impacts, and improving management by stakeholders
and governance by policy makers to deal with water scarcity, droughts and climate change. Sound
management and governance is quite a challenge because of the wide and complex range of goods
and services provided by water, including private goods, common pool resources, and public goods.
This paper presents an empirical assessment of three water policy instruments to address water
scarcity and droughts: water pricing, water markets, and common property governance. A direct
comparison of the three policies is made by developing and applying an integrated hydro-economic
model of the Jucar Basin in Spain, analyzing the economic and environmental effects of each policy.
Water pricing and water markets are economic instruments that work well when water is a private
good, but less well when water is a common pool resource or public good. Studies in California and
Australia demonstrate the large gains of water markets, both potential gains in California [22,30] and
actual gains in Australia [24,25].
We present evidence from Spain, a community with an ancient tradition of cooperation among
stakeholders in water user associations dating back centuries. Evidence from Spain regarding
alternative proposed policy instruments is derived from the Jucar Basin, where water markets, water
pricing, and institutional policies are simulated under drought.
The empirical results highlight that both institutional and water market policies are
economically-efficient instruments to limit the economic damage costs of droughts, achieving similar
social benefits in terms of private and environmental benefits. This finding is important because it
shows that in the case of Jucar, the status quo institutional policy can attain almost the same private
benefits as water markets.
The advantages of water markets compared to the institutional policy of stakeholders’ cooperation
are a slight reduction in land fallowing, a small improvement in irrigation efficiency, and a more
even distribution of drought losses among irrigation districts, important for equity concerns. Water
markets minimize private economic damages from drought but disregard the environmental benefits.
Results show that water markets entail a reduction of water for environmental purposes, causing
faster ecosystem regime shifts compared to the current institutional setting. The reason lies with
the public good characteristic of environmental flows, which are external to markets, leading to
excessive ecosystem degradation. This is important when planning for a future with climate change
and emerging social demands for and economic benefits from aquatic ecosystem protection.
Water pricing is the policy advocated by the European WFD. This policy poses important
implementation challenges in arid and semiarid regions such as Spain, where irrigation is the largest
user of water, with strong impacts on the supply of a wide range of ecosystem services. The water
pricing policy for managing drought is detrimental to farmers. Implementing water pricing instead of
water markets or institutional policies, increases farmers’ losses by 80 and 100 million Euros, a high
percentage of their base incomes, under mild and severe drought, respectively.
These benefit losses are the opportunity costs of the water pricing policy to farmers, and the
steep opportunity costs of water pricing would be economically and politically damaging. The
main empirical finding on water pricing is that farmers lose from half to two thirds of their net
benefits when the water pricing policy is implemented during drought, instead of the water market or
institutional policies. Enforcing water pricing will become a difficult task facing tough political and
technical hurdles.
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The empirical results show that water market and institutional policies are much more
economically attractive and equitable than water pricing, because water pricing involves
disproportionate costs to farmers. There are also additional measures for these two policies that
could enhance the protection of environmental flows. One measure is public water buyback programs
for water markets, in order to reap the benefits of water markets while protecting ecosystems. The other
measure is greening the cooperation in the institutional policy, by including the environment as a full
stakeholder in the process of water allocation among sectors and spatial locations. However, protecting
the environment with water pricing will require adding further “environmental” and “resource use”
costs to water prices (in WFD terminology), resulting in highly disproportionate costs to farmers.
Water management in the JRB is based on the negotiation and cooperation of stakeholders,
which seems to provide a worthwhile prospect for sustainable water management in irrigation.
In fact, this approach achieves better environmental outcomes compared to other policy instruments,
and almost the same outcomes in terms of farmers’ private benefits and social benefits compared
to the water market policy. However, the status quo institutional-based approach poses difficult
implementation challenges in real-world situations. The reasons are that institutions may involve
asymmetric negotiation power among the stakeholders, while the severe scarcity of water resources
may considerably reduce incentives for cooperation.
The evidence from the JRB highlights that, despite these limitations, the status quo
institutional-based approach of stakeholders’ cooperation was able to reduce environmental and
economic damages during the last drought period, and to surrogate social conflicts by cooperation.
The JRB experience suggests that the implementation of the institutional approach in managing water
resources requires sufficient institutional capacity to deal with power asymmetry and resource scarcity,
as well as available social capital supporting cooperation, which is particularly necessary for the
promotion of self-regulation initiatives.
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